This is an English translation of something I wrote at the end of 2014. The last part, especially, unfortunately proved to be correct.
Apparently Dugin started to upset some. I don’t know how much the character himself, or more probably the movement of ideas he generated.
From my point of view, Dugin represents the symbol of an anti-ideology. Known as a preference for an Eurasian coagulation, Dugin’s ideology without ideology is meant to be an opposition to Euro-Atlanticism. More deeply, Dugin’s movement builds its possible attraction basis on the criticism of Soros-type globalism. On that respect, it cannot fail, globalism existing largely due to the efficiency demonstrated by the method of propaganda and destabilization synthesized under the ‘open society’ Soros brand.
I watched Dugin, briefly, through one or two videos. I had no patience, he expressed himself in a cumbersome, unpleasant English. I followed more two of his ‘disciples’, so to speak, in fact people with their own opinions, the advantage of duginism consisting in the large area of nuances that it can embrace.
The common core to which the different approaches relate can be summed up as an attempt to validate the notion of an abstracted nationalism, in which the sense of belonging, family values, respect for tradition and local faith take precedence. If it wouldn’t have been so vague when it comes to determine which are the specific values the variables of tradition, faith, family (or close group) held, duginism could be likened to a conservative ideology. As it looks now (well, what I understood) it simply wants to propose a method capable of counteracting sorosism. To that effect, the opposition should act in a decentralized manner, the coordination being obtained by inviting those interested to recognize, on their own, both the enemy and the common points they share with alleged allies.
In this flexibility one could recognize the strength of the movement. Obviously, that could also prove to be its weakest point, especially as it disseminates to more distant geographic coordinates.
The reduced duginism proposes a Russian-European alliance (with a classic wink at Germany) that would separate the US (i.e. atlanticism) from Eurasia. For this to happen (the even narrower interpretation of) duginism suggests that the entire area between central Europe and Russia should emancipate itself from the semi-colonial status and recognize the common interests those countries share with the areas from Asia – represented by Russia – and those from western Europe – represented by Germany.
A solid proof that the region is sensitive, that it hurts, is brought by the Americanized geopolitical ‘wedge’ construction between Germany and Russia. A task that most politicians in the respective area countries endeavor to zealously execute.
The difference between the classic Russian-German partition of the continent (which, periodically, makes Poland disappear from the map) lies in the attempt to win the collaboration of the respective countries. The inevitable attractiveness that such a message will acquire over time has been noticed by rivals.
The first reaction, as possible it is to discern, would be to call Germany to order and to entrust the most reliable political faction there with the mission of supervising, within a colonial frame, the sensitive Eastern European area. The method for controlling the victim countries would remain the soros-type brainwashing, intertwined with judicial power dictate under (hopefully) a Germanic style accountability. In other words, sort of a politically correct Austria-Hungary remake enforcing the same set of [globalist imperial] ‘values’ : uprooting, atomization of society, de-Christianization and métissage of all kinds, that is, largely the opposite of the criteria the essence of generalized duginism proclaims, even if it expresses them in a convoluted way.
A backup version or, who knows, maybe the first option just waiting for optimal conditions, remains a war with Russia.
The crisis in Ukraine fits, logically, both variants.
In the first case, the Americans (supported by their loyalists in the EU) shifted the focus closer to Russia, in order to preserve their influence over the part of Eastern Europe that they already had integrated.
In the second case, it forces the emergence of a focal point that may impose on Russia the ‘necessary’ reaction needed to justify a war while, at the same time, is trying to position the West as advantageously as it is possible from a strategic point of view.
In my opinion, duginism could muster influence as a strong message only to the extent that it can still resonate, in the West, with the appeal to traditional values, that is, it largely depends on the degree of Soros infestation present in the minds of the people there. A risky bet.
NOTE: 7+ years after, duginism, again in my not so well informed opinion, seems unable to brush away a sort of ‘strangeness’ and lack of structure which may confirm its ideology without ideology status but make it impracticable.