Feels good to be confirmed (as in someone thinking in similar terms; someone who’s producing solid analysis regarding the flow of the war) about the two most significant points I made in my The Kharkov test video by the Military Summary channel creator.

The first point being that a city like Kharkov needs to fall to the Russians in order for an Ukrainian collapse to have a chance to happen. I picked either Kharkov or Odessa as a necessary step before a possible breaking point occurs and eventually I chose Kharkov as more probable. Dima from Military Summary takes either Kharkov or Zaporojie as needed to be conquered before a possible military collapse could begin manifesting within Ukraine’s army.

The second point which I thought important referred to the amount of losses Ukraine is willing and/or able to take and my conclusion was that, while those taken so far are significant, Ukraine can still absorb quite a lot more before military dissolution comes. Dima’s conclusion is similar and surely much more substantiated (including also interesting considerations about the mobilization power Ukraine has at its disposal).

I also appreciated his cautious approach regarding HIMARS and their impact on war operations. While few in number, they might constitute a problem that, finally – from Ukraine/Western perspective, could pose a challenge for the Russians. At least, for now, they are forced to find a new approach in dealing with them which most of the previous systems either didn’t need or was quickly found without much disturbance.

The change of seasons and its impact on military operations is also noteworthy, though I believe the topic is larger and extends beyond the military realm. But it broadens the perspective enough to underline that the time factor, upon which I also insist with each occasion, is extremely important.

Dima makes a good, sort of empirical, observation when it compares the start of the war until mid April interval (late winter-beginning of spring) with the evolution of hostilities after spring (then summer) settled in. But I dare to observe that the presumed much higher off road mobility modern armor and armored vehicles claim is not as good as advertised anyhow (and you always may stumble on the weakest/slowest/less capable link in the equipment chain). I honestly doubt an, let’s say, October Russian offensive west of Dniepr river wouldn’t be seriously influenced by weather and its impact on the terrain. It obviously goes both ways and if the imaginary, for now, Ukrainian counter-offensive materializes then it should happen before a major seasonal change occurs.

A lot of other interesting stuff in his talk with The Duran‘s Alexander Mercouris.

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